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PROSECUTOR v. TAYLOR: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR BASHAR AL-ASSAD 
Steven J. Rose* 
Abstract: Charles Taylor was the first sitting head of state to be indicted, 
tried, and convicted by an international criminal tribunal, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. This comment explores the procedural and struc-
tural similarities between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the In-
ternational Criminal Court. This comment then compares the evidence 
used to convict Charles Taylor and the evidence currently available about 
possible war crimes and crimes against humanity ongoing in Syria. Finally, 
this comment argues that Bashar al-Assad should be tried before the In-
ternational Criminal Court, and that the Taylor case can be used as a tem-
plate, due to the similarities between the courts and the evidence in each 
situation.  
Introduction 
 On April 26, 2012, Charles Taylor, then President of Liberia, be-
came the first Head of State indicted while in office, and later convicted 
by an international criminal tribunal.1 The Special Court for Sierra Le-
one (Special Court) found Taylor individually responsible2 for plan-
ning, aiding, and abetting crimes against humanity and war crimes.3 
But Taylor was not found guilty under theories of participating in a 
joint criminal enterprise, instigating or ordering the crimes, or superior 
                                                                                                                      
* Steven Rose is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Re-
view. 
1 Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor 
Hails Conviction of Charles Taylor (Apr. 26, 2012) http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx? 
fileticket=hCajjMya09g%3d&tabid=196. 
2 See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), Sierra Leone–United 
Nations, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6(1), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S 137. [hereinafter Special Court Statute] (defining individual responsibility as re-
sponsibility for planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abet-
ting in the planning preparation or execution of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
Special Court). 
3 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 6953, 6971 (May 18, 
2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=k%2b03KREEPCQ%3d&tabid=107. 
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responsibility.4 Consequently, the Special Court sentenced Taylor to 
fifty years of incarceration.5 In the current unrest in Syria, some of the-
se same crimes6 are being perpetrated by the Syrian military.7 Using 
Prosecutor v. Taylor as a guide, the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
which shares important functional and procedural similarities8 with the 
Special Court, should take action to impose accountability on those 
responsible for the crimes under its jurisdiction.9 
 Part I of this Comment discusses the background information rel-
evant to the violence in Sierra Leone leading to the conviction of Tay-
lor. Part II provides the procedures and basis for the referral of inci-
dents to an international criminal court, along with the standards used 
to evaluate cases. Part III of this Comment argues that the case against 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. ¶¶ 6900, 6972, 6973, 6986. Superior responsibility is imposed if a person knew or 
had reason to know a subordinate was going to or had committed such crimes, and failed 
to prevent or punish such commission. Special Court Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.3. 
5 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Sentencing Judgment, Part IV, (May 
30, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=U6xCITNg4tY%3d&tabid=107. 
6 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶ 12. 
7 Oral Update of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, In-
dep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 20th Sess., June 18, 2012–July 
6, 2012 ¶¶ 62–87, A/HR/20/CRP.1, June 26, 2012 [hereinafter Syria Update]. Specifically, 
the alleged crimes include unlawful killings, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary arrest and 
detention, and violations of children’s rights. Id. 
8 See Special Court Statute, supra note 2, arts. 1–5, 17(3), 17(4)(g); Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, arts. 3, 5, 7(1)(a)–(k), 8, 17(3), 17(4)(g), 66, 67, 69, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Special Court for Sierra Leone R. Pro-
cedure and Evid. 85, 87(a), 89, 90(b) http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Psp 
%2bFh0%2bwSI%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter Court Rules]; International Criminal Court 
R. of Procedure and Evid., ICC–ASP/1/3, 63(5), 66 [hereinafter ICC Rules]; Micaela Frul-
li, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L., 857, 862–
66 (2000) (explaining that numerous elements of the Special Court Statute derived from 
the Rome Statute). The Rome Statute is a treaty enacted by the United Nations which cre-
ated the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 8, preamble–arts. 1, 5. 
9 See Navi Pillay, High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm’n, The Dete-
riorating Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Killings in El-
Houleh, ( June 1, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ 
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12210&LangID=E). Navi Pillay, the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights urges the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC. Id. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes such as murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment in viola-
tion of fundamental rules of international law, torture, sexual violence, enforced disap-
pearances, and other inhumane acts. Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 3, 5, 7(1)(a)–(k). 
The Special Court has jurisdiction over such crimes as murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution on political, racial, 
ethnic, or religious grounds, and other inhumane acts. Special Court Statute, supra note 2, 
arts. 1–4. 
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Taylor should be used as a blueprint for indicting, trying, and convict-
ing Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria. 
I. Background 
 The Special Court exists to prosecute those people most responsi-
ble for violations of international human rights law, crimes against hu-
manity, the Geneva Conventions10, and the laws of Sierra Leone com-
mitted after November 30, 1996.11 The Special Court specifically 
retained the ability to prosecute individuals who were previously grant-
ed amnesty through the Lomé Agreement.12 Acting pursuant to a Unit-
ed Nations Security Council resolution,13 the U.N. entered into an 
agreement with the government of Sierra Leone14 to create the Special 
Court.15 The Special Court consists of judges chosen for their moral 
character, impartiality, and experience in international humanitarian 
law.16 The Prosecutor is responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
the individuals most culpable for the crimes under the Special Court’s 
jurisdiction.17 Both the judges and the Prosecutor must remain inde-
                                                                                                                      
10 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (specifying violations to include mur-
der, mutilation, torture, terrorism, or humiliating treatment of civilians) [hereinafter Ge-
neva Convention]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 
art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. Performing or 
threatening violence, enforced prostitution, rape, sexual assault, torture, slavery, or pillage 
is prohibited. Additional Protocol II, supra note 10, arts. 4(1)–(2). There is also a prohibi-
tion on the recruitment of children under the age of 15 into armed conflict, or allowing 
such children to participate. Id. art. 4(3). 
11 See Special Court Statute, supra note 2, arts. 1–3, 5. 
12 See id. art. 10; Matrangai Sirleaf, Regional Approach to Transnational Justice? Examining 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth & Reconciliation Commission for Liberia, 21 Fla. 
J. Int’l L. 209, 224 (2009); Milena Sterio, Rethinking Amnesty, 34 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 
373, 384–85 (2006); Wiliam Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 145, 153–54 
(2004–2005). The Lomé Agreement ended the civil conflict in Sierra Leone, and granted 
Amnesty to fighters from the RUF and AFRC. Schabas, supra note 12, at at 147–48. 
13 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315, 2–3 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
14 Agreement Between The United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of a Special Court For Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone–United Nations, Jan. 
16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter the U.N.–Sierra Leone Agreement]; Special 
Court Agreement, 2002 (Ratification) Act, (2002) Vol. 133, No. 22, Supplement to the 
Sierra Leone Gazette, (Act No. 9/2002). 
15 U.N.–Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 14, preamble–art.1. 
16 Special Court Statute, supra note 2, art. 13 
17 See id. art. 15. 
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pendent, and cannot seek or accept instructions from any government 
or other source.18 
 The Prosecutor brought an indictment against Taylor, alleging his 
individual responsibility for crimes against humanity, violations of the 
Geneva Conventions, and international humanitarian law.19 First, the 
indictment alleged that Taylor was responsible individually for the plan-
ning, instigating, committing, ordering, and aiding and abetting the 
commission of the crimes.20 Second, the indictment alleged that Taylor 
was responsible for the actions of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) through a 
theory of superior responsibility based on his authority over RUF and 
AFRC soldiers.21 Taylor was arraigned on April 3, 200622 and the trial 
lasted 46 months before officially closing on March 11, 2011.23 The Spe-
cial Court found Taylor guilty of aiding and abetting and planning the 
crimes.24 
 In finding Taylor responsible for aiding and abetting, the Special 
Court determined that Taylor provided arms and munitions,25 military 
personnel,26 operational support, 27 and encouragement to the leaders 
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. arts. 13(1), 15. 
19 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Prosecution’s Second Amended 
Indictment ¶ 33 (May 29, 2007) http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=lrn0bAAM 
vYM%3d&tabid=107 [hereinafter Indictment] (alleging acts of terrorism, unlawful killings, 
sexual violence, physical violence, the use of child soldiers, abductions and forced labor, 
and pillage); Special Court Statute, supra note 2, arts. 2–4. 
20 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Indictment ¶ 33. 
21 Id. ¶ 34; Special Court Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.3. 
22 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment Summary ¶ 2 (Apr. 26, 
2012) http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=86r0nQUtK08%3d&tabid=53 [here-
inafter Judgment Summary]. 
23 Id. ¶ 8. 
24 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 6953, 6971. 
25 Id. ¶¶ 6910–6912, 6953. The Special Court found that Taylor directly and indirectly 
supplied the RUF and AFRC with small arms, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Id. 
The RUF and AFRC used these arms and munitions in widespread and systematic attacks 
on civilians. Id. 
26 See id. ¶¶ 6918–6923, 6953. The Special Court found Taylor sent approximately 170 
fighters to fight for the leaders of the RUF and AFRC, and that these troops participated in 
the attacks on civilians. Id. Taylor also reorganized and rearmed fighters retreating from 
Liberia, and returned them to the conflict. Id. 
27 See id. ¶¶ 6927–6936, 6953. The Special Court found Taylor provided communica-
tions technology, financial support, warnings of imminent attacks, guesthouses, assistance 
with transportation of arms and munitions, and security escorts to the leaders of the RUF 
and AFRC. Id. 
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of the RUF and the AFRC.28 Moreover, the Special Court found these 
actions materially aided the soldiers in the commission of the crimes,29 
and that Taylor provided such aid knowing that the crimes were being 
committed.30 Evidence including U.N. Reports and widespread media 
coverage proved that Taylor was aware of the crimes and the mindset of 
the soldiers perpetrating such crimes.31 
 The Special Court also found Taylor guilty for planning the 
crimes.32 Taylor worked with leaders of the RUF and AFRC to develop 
military strategy for attacking particular targets, including the modus 
operandi, or the manner in which the operations were conducted.33 The 
Special Court noted that Taylor communicated frequently with the 
RUF and AFRC commanders, receiving updates on the progress of the 
operations.34 In undertaking the plan developed by Taylor, RUF and 
AFRC forces committed terrorism, murder, rape, cruel treatment, and 
other inhumane acts.35 
 But the Special Court did not find Taylor individually responsible 
for ordering the RUF and AFRC to commit the underlying crimes.36 
Having found Taylor responsible for aiding and abetting, the Special 
Court chose not to find him responsible for instigating such crimes.37 
Additionally, the Special Court found Taylor did not participate in a 
joint criminal enterprise.38 The final question for the Special Court was 
Taylor’s responsibility by virtue of superior responsibility, or his supe-
rior command and control over subordinate RUF and AFRC soldiers.39 
The Special Court found Taylor exerted substantial influence, but not 
                                                                                                                      
28 Id. ¶¶ 6940–6945, 6953. The Special Court found that Taylor gave military advice 
and strategy to the leaders of the RUF and AFRC with regard to military targets and the 
purposes for which such targets were to be used if captured. Id. 
29 Id. ¶¶ 6915, 6924, 6937, 6946; see also sources cited supra notes 24–28. 
30 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 6947–6949. 
31 Id. ¶ 6950 & n. 15580 (providing a substantial list of citations to media articles cover-
ing the situation in Sierra Leone and the crimes committed). 
32 Id. ¶ 6971. 
33 Id. ¶¶ 6958–6959. 
34 Id. ¶ 6960. 
35 Id. ¶¶ 6958–6959, 6967. 
36 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶ 6973 (noting Taylor advised leaders of 
the RUF and AFRC, but his advice and directions were not followed). 
37 Id. ¶ 6972. 
38 Id. ¶ 6900 (finding Taylor provided support for the 1991 invasion of Sierra Leone, 
but without evidence that such was done in furtherance of a common plan). The Special 
Court also noted the existence of common enemies as alternative motivation for providing 
such aid. Id. ¶¶ 6891–6900. 
39 Id. ¶¶ 6974–6986. 
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effective control over the RUF and AFRC.40 Specifically noted was that 
Taylor gave advice to certain leaders, but such advice was not followed 
by the leaders of the RUF and AFRC. 41 As such, the requisite superior-
subordinate relationship did not exist.42 The Special Court held that to 
exercise effective control, a leader needed to have the ability to prevent 
or punish the commission of such crimes.43 
II. Discussion 
 The ICC is the world’s first permanent, treaty based international 
criminal tribunal.44 It exists to prevent war crimes and crimes against 
humanity by establishing a court to end impunity and exercise jurisdic-
tion over persons responsible for such crimes.45 To create the ICC, The 
U.N. adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute).46 The ICC has jurisdiction over only the most serious 
crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
the crime of aggression, exercised over any state party to the Rome 
Statute.47 Currently 122 States are party to the Rome Statute.48 
 There are three methods by which the ICC can exercise jurisdic-
tion.49 First, a State party to the Rome Statute can refer a situation un-
der the jurisdiction of the ICC to the ICC Prosecutor.50 Second, the 
U.N. Security Council can refer such a situation to the ICC Prosecu-
tor.51 Third, the ICC Prosecutor can initiate investigations of his or her 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. ¶ 6979. 
41 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 6980–6983. 
42 Id. ¶ 6985. 
43 Id. ¶ 6978. 
44 About the Court, Icc-cpi.int, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the% 
20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).  
45 Rome Statute, supra note 8, preamble–arts. 1, 5 (“[It is d]etermined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of 
such crimes.”). Impunity refers to a person’s ability to escape the detrimental effects of his 
or her actions. Black’s Law Dictionary 826 (9th ed. 2009). 
46 See Rome Statute, supra note 8, preamble–art 1. 
47 See id. arts. 5, 12(1). 
48 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, Icc–cpi.int, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ 
asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
49 Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 12, 13. 
50 See id. arts. 13–14. “The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently . . . [and] 
shall be responsible for receiving referrals and . . . examining them for and conducting 
investigations and prosecutions before the Court. A member of the Office shall not seek or 
act on instructions from any external source.” Id. art. 42(1). 
51 Id. art. 13(b). Such referral requires nine affirmative votes, including affirmative 
votes from all of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. See U.N. Charter 
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own accord, based on an assessment of information regarding crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.52 Regardless of the manner in which 
jurisdiction is conferred upon the ICC, jurisdiction may only be exer-
cised over actions taken after July 1, 2002.53 The ICC has jurisdiction 
over a citizen of a state not party to the Rome Statute only if the defen-
dant’s state or the state in which the crimes occurred agree to the juris-
diction of the ICC, or upon referral by the U.N. Security Council.54 
 Prior to the ICC, the U.N. established International Criminal Tri-
bunals to preside over specific instances of particularly heinous state-
sponsored crimes, such as crimes against humanity.55 Similarly, in co-
operation with state governments, the U.N. created special courts to 
adjudicate situations involving actors in states not party to the Rome 
Statute,56 or committed before the Rome Statute entered into force.57 
One such court was the Special Court, because the timing of the crimes 
placed them outside the jurisdiction of the ICC.58 
 The ICC and the Special Court are not bound by national rules of 
evidence, but rather by a particular set of Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence established for each Court.59 Each court has considerable leeway 
                                                                                                                      
art. 27. The permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are China, France, Russia, 
Great Britain, and The United States. Id. art. 23. 
52 Id. arts. 13, 15. 
53 See id. art. 11. The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. Id. art 3. 
54 See Brendan Leanos, Comment, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future of the In-
ternational Criminal Court Through its Involvement in Libya, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 2267, 2282 & 
nn.119–20 (2012). 
55 See S.C. Res. 995, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing at the re-
quest of the government of Rwanda, an International Criminal Tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (adopting the report of the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral and establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). 
56 S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 ¶¶ 1–2 (May 30, 2007) (establishing, at the 
request of the government of Lebanon, an international tribunal to adjudicate the terror-
ist bombing of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri). Lebanon is not a party 
to the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at 5. 
57 See G.A. Res. 57/228B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228B, Annex arts. 1–2 (May 22, 2003) 
(establishing the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for crimes commit-
ted between Apr. 1975 and Jan. 1979). Cambodia is now a party to the Rome Statute. 
Rome Statute, supra note 8, at 4. 
58 See U.N–Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 14, preamble, art. 1; Rome Statute, su-
pra note 8, art. 11. Sierra Leone is a party to the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 8, 
at 6. The crimes however, took place before July 1, 2002. See Indictment, supra note 19 
¶¶ 6–31 (listing crimes occurring between Nov. 30, 1996 and Jan. 18, 2002). 
59 See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 21(1)(a); Court Rules, supra note 8, 89; ICC 
Rules, supra note 8, 63(5); Bruce Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Army Law. 1, 9–10 (Sept. 2002). 
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to admit relevant evidence,60 including witness testimony, written 
statements, and expert testimony.61 All adult witnesses must be sworn to 
tell the truth before the court,62 and all witnesses must be available for 
full examination and cross examination.63 A number of features of the 
Special Court were directly influenced by the Rome Statute, such as the 
inclusion of procedural error as a basis for appeal.64 
 These rules enabled the Special Court to rely on circumstantial 
evidence if the only reasonable inference which could be drawn from 
the evidence tended toward proof of guilt.65 The Prosecutor admitted 
documentary evidence against Taylor through testimony of witnesses, 
in lieu of oral testimony,66 and in the form of documents of the U.N. 
and U.N. bodies, non-governmental and Associated Press news releases, 
and BBC radio broadcasts.67 Exercising its ability to allow “any relevant 
evidence,”68 the Special Court allowed witnesses to offer both personal 
knowledge and hearsay evidence.69 
 The Special Court used the evidence to determine the guilt or in-
nocence of Taylor under two different theories: 1) responsibility for 
planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and 
abetting the planning preparation or execution of the crimes;70and 2) 
superior responsibility arising from his failure to prevent or punish un-
lawful acts by his subordinates.71 
                                                                                                                      
60 Court Rules, supra note 8, 89(C) (“A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence.”); 
Rome Statute, supra note 8, 69(3); Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC–01/04–01/06, Judg-
ment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute ¶ 107 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi. 
int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf; Nancy A. Coumbs, Evidence, in Routledge Handbook 
of International Criminal Law 324, 327 (William Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011); 
Robert Creyer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Proce-
dure 383 (2007). 
61 Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 69; Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment 
¶ 162. 
62 Court Rules, supra note 8, 90(b); ICC Rules, supra note 8, 66. 
63 See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 67(1)(e); Court Rules, supra note 8, 85. 
64 Frulli, supra note 8, at 862–86. 
65 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 170–171. The ICC has used similar 
procedures. See Dyilo, Case No. ICC–01/04–01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute ¶ 111. 
66 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶ 162. 
67 Id. ¶¶ 200–201 & n. 470. 
68 Id. ¶ 168; Court Rules, supra note 8, 89(c). 
69 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 170–173. 
70 Special Court Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(1); Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judg-
ment ¶¶ 454–487. 
71 Special Court Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(3); Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judg-
ment ¶¶ 488–502. 
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 First, aiding and abetting requires the Prosecutor prove Taylor 
provided practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support, which 
had a substantial effect on the commission of a crime.72 Second, the 
Prosecutor must prove Taylor knew that his acts aided the perpetrator 
in the commission of the crimes, and he must have been aware of the 
essential elements, including the requisite mental state of the underly-
ing offenses.73 The Prosecutor did not need to prove that Taylor shared 
the mental state of the perpetrator.74 
 Proving Taylor planned the crimes required the Prosecutor prove 
Taylor intentionally designed an act, intending or knowing it was sub-
stantially likely that a crime would be committed in the execution of 
the designed act.75 The Prosecutor did not need to prove Taylor’s plan 
was necessary for the commission of the underlying crime; however he 
needed to prove that the plan significantly contributed to such com-
mission.76 The Special Court found that Taylor contributed to the selec-
tion of military targets, and the strategies used against such targets.77 
Taylor’s awareness of the commission of the crimes was established 
through his receipt of military and news reports.78 
 First, proving responsibility for ordering the crimes required the 
Prosecutor to show Taylor intentionally instructed another person to 
perform a particular act.79 Second, the Prosecutor had to show that 
Taylor was in a position of authority over the perpetrator, such that he 
could compel the perpetrator to obey the order.80 The Special Court 
held that the evidence that Taylor issued orders was evidence that he 
held a position of authority.81 The Special Court, however, found Taylor 
not guilty of ordering the crimes because his instructions were advisory 
in nature and at times not followed by the RUF and AFRC leadership.82 
 To find Taylor guilty under a theory of superior responsibility, the 
Special Court needed to find that Taylor had effective control over the 
perpetrators.83 The Prosecutor also needed to show that Taylor had or 
                                                                                                                      
72 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶ 482. 
73 Id. ¶¶ 486–487. 
74 Id. ¶ 487. 
75 Id. ¶ 469. 
76 Id. ¶ 470. 
77 Id. ¶¶ 6958–6965. 
78 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 6969–6970. 
79 Id. ¶ 474. 
80 See id. ¶ 475. 
81 See id. ¶ 481. 
82 Id. ¶ 6973. 
83 Id. ¶¶ 490, 493–494. 
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should have had knowledge that the crimes had been or were about to 
be committed.84 The Prosecutor was allowed to use circumstantial evi-
dence to prove actual knowledge, and imputed knowledge required 
only that Taylor have general notice of a risk that crimes might be car-
ried out by his subordinates.85 Finally the Prosecutor needed to prove 
Taylor failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to prevent or 
punish the commission of the crimes.86 The actions considered reason-
able and necessary depend on the circumstances, and the degree of 
authority Taylor held over the perpetrators.87 The Special Court found 
that the leaders of the RUF and AFRC received guidance and instruc-
tion from Taylor, but were not his subordinates.88 The Special Court 
further found that any soldiers Taylor sent to fight in Sierra Leone did 
not remain under his effective control.89 Thus, the Special Court found 
Taylor not guilty under a theory of superior responsibility.90 
 Both the ICC and the Special Court have jurisdiction over only 
those crimes listed in the establishing statutes, and such statutes cover 
nearly identical crimes.91 In both courts, the accused is considered in-
nocent until proven guilty,92 and is under no obligation to testify.93 The 
accused will only be found guilty after the Prosecutor proves the 
charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.94 The judges of the Special 
Court are responsible for evaluating witness testimony, and resolving 
any inconsistencies.95 The Special Court took into consideration in re-
solving such inconsistencies the circumstances and events endured by 
                                                                                                                      
84 Taylor, Case No. SCSL–03–01–T, Judgment ¶¶ 490, 496. 
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tions of international humanitarian law. See Special Court Statute, supra note 2, arts. 3–5; 
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the witnesses.96 Similarly judges in the ICC evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses, taking into consideration the circumstances and events wit-
nesses experienced.97 
 In the ongoing situation in Syria, evidence exists of potential war 
crimes, along with the knowledge of such crimes by Assad.98 Official 
condemnation of the Assad government has been sharp and continu-
ous, with the U.N. Human Rights Council, other international humani-
tarian organizations, and the U.S. Senate condemning the actions taken 
by Assad’s government in Syria.99 The Prime Minister of Turkey recently 
expressed frustration with the U.N. for not doing more to stop Assad 
and the spread of violence.100 The Obama administration has been cri-
tiqued for not intervening in Syria, with or without U.N. support.101 
U.N. and media reports have extensively documented the crimes com-
mitted in Syria.102 These reports rely upon both witness testimony and 
documentary evidence.103 The U.N. continues to collect evidence re-
garding the crimes taking places in Syria, by voting to extend the evi-
dence gathering mission of the Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on Syria (Syria Commission).104 Furthermore, as President of 
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Syria, Assad is the Syrian commander in chief.105 Assad has also taken 
direct command of the Syrian military,106 and the forces accused of 
committing the crimes are members of the Syrian military.107 
III. Analysis 
 Taylor not only can be used as a blueprint for a case against Assad, 
but it should be used as such. Some international law scholars argue that 
states have an affirmative “duty to prosecute grave international 
crimes.”108 Not only do many states have obligations arising from inter-
national treaties,109 but prosecuting war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity on an international level raises the stigma associated with such 
crimes, and “demonstrates that impunity is unacceptable.”110 These 
prosecutions also act as a source of retribution, rehabilitation, account-
ability, justice, deterrence, and the rule of law.111 
 The ICC can serve as a functional equivalent of the Special 
Court.112 The purpose of each Court is to prosecute the individuals 
most responsible for the crimes of greatest gravity in international law 
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who would otherwise act with impunity.113 Both Courts exercise limited 
jurisdiction, restricted to a specific and nearly identical set of crimes.114 
The Courts provide similar rights and protections to the accused, in-
cluding the presumption of innocence,115 right to remain silent,116 and 
the right to cross examine any witness brought by the Prosecutor.117 
Moreover, both Courts allow for consideration of relevant evidence 
which may not be admissible in state courts, such as hearsay,118 and cir-
cumstantial evidence.119 In fact, in several decisions the ICC has cited 
cases heard before the Special Court in determining the reliability of 
evidence,120 the interpretation of the scope of crimes, 121 and in defin-
ing the mental state needed for responsibility for the actions of subor-
dinates.122 
 The current situation in Syria shares important similarities with the 
situation that the Special Court adjudicated in Sierra Leone, with many 
of the same crimes being committed.123 In fact, had the crimes in Taylor 
occurred after July 1, 2002, the case could have been heard before the 
ICC.124 Just as the Special Court used U.N. and media reports as proof 
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of Taylor’s knowledge of the crimes being committed in Sierra Leo-
ne,125 extensive U.N. and media reports have documented the crimes 
committed during the ongoing violence in Syria.126 The U.N. is con-
tinuing to collect evidence regarding the ongoing crimes by extending 
the mandate of the Syria Commission.127 Moreover, the U.N. reports on 
the ongoing violence in Syria rely on the same types of evidence used in 
Taylor, notably witness testimony,128 and documentary evidence.129 As 
such, Taylor can be used as a template for a case against Assad for the 
crimes occurring in Syria. 
 Not only are the cases comparable, but the case against Assad is 
stronger than the case against Taylor.130 The Special Court relied on the 
fact that Taylor was in frequent contact with the RUF and AFRC troops, 
after having aided in the planning of the targets and operational strat-
egies in its determination of his guilt for planning the crimes in Sierra 
Leone.131 Since the specific orders he gave were not actually carried out 
by the RUF and AFRC troops, the Special Court found Taylor not guilty 
of ordering the crimes.132 In Syria, reports by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council indicate that the operations carried out by the Syrian military 
which resulted in human rights violations were conducted in such a 
manner as to require state directives.133 Furthermore, Assad has taken 
direct day-to-day command of the Syrian military, rather than operating 
through aides.134 In contrast to the orders given by Taylor, which were 
advisory in nature and not obeyed,135 the orders given by Assad have 
been carried out.136 As such, the element needed for conviction for or-
dering the crimes is no longer missing.137 
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 In addition, the case against Assad for superior responsibility is 
stronger than that against Taylor.138 Taylor was not directly in command 
of the RUF and AFRC forces,139 leading the Special Court to find that 
Taylor did not have the superior-subordinate relationship with the RUF 
and AFRC troops required to find him guilty.140 In contrast, Assad has 
direct control of the Syrian military.141 Assad, as President of Syria, is 
the commander in chief, exercising effective control over the soldiers 
personally carrying out the crimes.142 As such, despite the Assad gov-
ernment’s refusal to grant the Syria Commission access to the country 
or to otherwise cooperate with fact–finding efforts,143 the ICC Prosecu-
tor has access to the evidence of the crimes, including witness testi-
mony, photographs, and satellite imagery.144 Moreover, Assad has the 
requisite relationship for superior responsibility.145 The U.N. Security 
Council should follow the urging of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and refer the situation in Syria to the ICC.146 
Conclusion 
 In Prosecutor v. Taylor, the Special Court proved that no one, not 
even a head of state, could commit crimes against humanity with im-
punity. The Special Court laid out a blueprint for future cases, by bal-
ancing the rights of the accused, the need for accountability, and the 
evidentiary procedures necessary to account for the difficulties in evi-
dence collection in conflict areas. The equivalent procedures of the 
ICC and the Special Court, and the comparable evidence used in Taylor 
and that which has been gathered so far in Syria, allow Taylor to be a 
template for a case against Assad. The similarities in the functioning of 
the Courts are paralleled by the similarities in the evidence against Tay-
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lor and Assad. The gravity of the crimes occurring in Syria and the fact 
that the ICC exists specifically to punish the perpetrators of such 
crimes, argue that the ICC has a duty to take action. The ICC can, and 
should use Taylor as a blueprint to hold Assad accountable. 
